In any event, the Supreme Court supported the view that parties should generally be restored to the position they were in before there was any illegality. For example, Lord Toulson said that "a person who satisfies the ordinary requirements of a claim in unjust enrichment will not prima facie be debarred from recovering money paid or property transferred by reason of the fact that the consideration which has failed was an unlawful consideration". 30 Similarly, Lord Neuberger said that "the general rule should in my view be that the claimant is entitled to the return of the money which he has paid", 31 which was consistently referred as "the Rule".
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The minority judges held similar views. Lord Sumption commented that restitution "merely recognises the ineffectiveness of the transaction and gives effect to the ordinary legal consequences of that state of affairs. The effect is to put the parties in the position in which they would have been if they had never entered into the illegal transaction, which in the eyes of the law is the position which they should always have been in". 33 Unfortunately, the minority judges employed the language of "rescission" to describe the process of restoring the parties to their original positions. 34 This is confusing. An illegal contract is void, so there is nothing to rescind. It is suggested that the judges were simply emphasising the primacy of the restitutionary remedy in order to restore the parties to the status quo ante through achieving restitutio in integrum.
However, Lord Kerr appeared to adopt a slightly different approach. His Lordship was influenced by Birks' contention that to allow restitution would "stultify" the law's refusal to enforce the contract. 35 This may be because restitution would be tantamount to enforcing the contract, 36 or because the restitutionary claim would provide a "safety net" in the event that the contract could not be enforced due to the illegality. 42 Since restitution might be ordered even when the illegal contract has been fully executed, 43 the better view seems to be that the illegality itself justifies the practical response of the courts to put the parties -so far as it is possible to do so -back into their original positions before the illegal transaction.
Another consequence of Patel v Mirza seems to be to sideline the locus poenitentiae, or 'time for repentance'. After all, the balancing approach necessarily takes into account whether the illegal purpose has been fulfilled. 44 Moreover, in Patel v Mirza itself there was no withdrawal, let alone repentance, but simply a change of circumstances which meant that the illegal purpose could no longer be performed. If a claimant does genuinely withdraw before any illegal purpose is carried out then that further strengthens his or her claim to restitution, but even without such withdrawal it now appears to be highly likely that restitution will be granted anyway. be some crimes so heinous that the courts will decline to award restitution in any circumstances". 47 His Lordship thought it impossible to distinguish between degrees of illegality, and unnecessary to do so since restitution should presumptively always be available.
It is of course true that distinguishing between different types of illegal conduct will often be very difficult to do, and it is not even clear why the offence of insider dealing was not thought
by Lord Toulson to be particularly serious. Nevertheless, it may well be unsatisfactory to award restitution no matter the nature of the illegality, and regardless of whether or not the illegal conduct has occurred. These issues will be analysed in the next section when considering the particular context of bribery.
II. The impact of Patel v Mirza on bribery
Bribery poses important and difficult problems, for both the criminal law and private brought in equity. After all, the recipient of a bribe is often induced to breach an obligation of the same bracket as drug trafficking such that restitution should not be awarded.
The next three possibilities are perhaps more promising. Thirdly, it might be argued that fiduciaries are in a special position because of the obligation of loyalty owed to a third party, the beneficiary. This may be one of the factors that the court should consider. Lord
Toulson was careful "not [to] attempt to lay down a prescriptive or definitive list" 79 of the factors to be taken into account, and as a result the position of the recipient of the bribe could well remain relevant. This would also help to protect the beneficiary's position.
A fourth possibility might be to conclude that the fiduciary is not enriched if he or she holds the bribe for the benefit of the principal. Indeed, one reason for the decision in FHR that a fiduciary holds a bribe on constructive trust for his or her principal was the need to combat moment of receipt, it is arguable that the fiduciary is not enriched such that no claim in unjust enrichment should lie. 81 Moreover, a claim brought by the briber against the beneficiary in unjust enrichment should fail since there is a good basis for the beneficiary's enrichment provided by the nature of the fiduciary relationship.
A further, fifth option may be to look at the three-party situation differently. Although the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza rejected the notion that the court had a free-standing jurisdiction to punish the parties to an illegal transaction by requiring disgorgement to a third party, 82 this principle would not be infringed simply by recognising the beneficiary's equitable proprietary rights. In order to favour the beneficiary's claim the court would not have to disgorge the recipient's profits in favour of a third party extraneous to the dispute. Rather, the court could give effect to the proprietary rights acquired by the beneficiary on the point of receipt, 83 and find that such rights outweigh the interest in restoring two parties -who are both tainted by illegality -to their respective original positions. Given the wide range of considerations that might be relevant to the balancing approach when deciding whether the illegality defence applies, it is suggested that this is a likely outcome. There is no need to deter the beneficiary, who has done nothing wrong, but every reason to seek to deter the conduct of both the briber and bribee. It would be unfortunate if a desire to unwind a transaction were to prejudice an innocent beneficiary to the advantage of a party tainted by illegality.
It is, however, possible to envisage situations where the fiduciary makes restitution to the briber before the beneficiary becomes aware of the bribe. Given the decision in Patel v Mirza, a fiduciary might genuinely think that restitution would be necessary. But it is suggested that this should not be encouraged or condoned. Since a constructive trust in favour of the beneficiary arises at the moment the fiduciary receives the bribe, paying back the bribe can be viewed as a breach of trust. It is suggested that the fiduciary should remain liable to account to the beneficiary, and that the beneficiary may be able to trace his or her equitable interest into the hands of the briber to whom restitution has been made.
III.

Breach of fiduciary duty: beyond bribery
The illegality defence does not play a prominent role in claims for breach of fiduciary duty beyond the context of bribes and secret commissions. It has been said that even where a fiduciary pleads illegality to try to defeat a claim brought by his or her principal for breach of duty, the illegality should not, generally, bar the claim since it would be unconscionable for the fiduciary to be better off as a result of the breach of duty. 84 This is sensible. It is, however, less clear whether, as a result of Patel v Mirza, a fiduciary may now be able to bring a claim in unjust enrichment against his or her principal, even though the parties both participated in an illegal scheme.
In Re Thomas, 85 a principal handed over money to his solicitor to be used for conducting it would have been difficult to establish any agreement sufficient for a "common intention"
without leading evidence of illegality. 108 Following Patel v Mirza, such a formalistic approach is not required: courts can look at all the evidence and decide whether a party should be prevented from enforcing a beneficial interest due to the illegality. 109 It is now even less likely that a party will be unable to claim a beneficial interest under a common intention constructive trust because of an illegal transaction.
It is suggested that, after Patel v Mirza, participation in an illegal transaction will prevent a claimant from enforcing a beneficial interest under a trust only in very unusual and rare circumstances. It is likely that the illegality will have to be particularly serious (such as terrorism offences 110 ). Yet it is difficult to state definitively what outcomes will be reached, since an approach involving the balancing of various relevant factors is inherently somewhat uncertain.
Lord Toulson was highly influenced by the work of the Law Commission on illegality, but it should be remembered that the law of trusts was the one area where the Law Commission recommended statutory reform. 111 Admittedly, this was largely because the Commission did not think it likely that Tinsley v Milligan would be departed from judicially, but the Commission was perhaps also influenced by many responses to its consultations which emphasised the need for certainty in the context of property rights. 112 Lord Toulson thought obviously weakened. As Lord Neuberger rightly observed, innocent third parties are entitled to expect the law to be clear, and "there is a general public interest in certainty and clarity in all areas of law".
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It remains unclear what the effect of illegality should be upon third parties to the trust. 115 For example, the claimant may not be a tainted beneficiary, but instead the beneficiary's creditor 116 or executor. 117 The more flexible approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza, and the desire to reach more transparently just outcomes, might suggest that the claims of an innocent creditor or executor should trump the claims of a defendant tainted by illegality. 118 Indeed, given the support extended to Lord Browne-Wilkinson's view in Tinsley v Milligan that the effect of illegality is procedural rather than substantive, 119 it seems possible for a court to say that whilst a beneficiary cannot personally enforce his or her rights due to the illegality defence, creditors or executors suing through the beneficiary may be able to.
It is also to be hoped that one factor to be taken account should be that the intended "victim" of the concealment may have an interest in the value of the assets of the beneficiary. 120 The Law Commission gave the example of a husband who may transfer property to his mistress in order to hide it from his wife. If a dispute were to arise between the husband and mistress over the ownership of the property, the court should be able to take into account the possibility that the wife might in the future bring a claim against her husband under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and that the value of the wife's possible claim could be reduced if the court were to decide that the husband did not in fact have an interest under a trust in the property transferred to the mistress because of the illegality defence.
trust. 124 The Law Commission concluded that these options were mutually exclusive, and that the illegality defence should operate in an all-or-nothing manner. 125 This is consistent with a traditional approach to the doctrine, but it is interesting to speculate whether the more flexible approach favoured in Patel v Mirza might have an impact upon the remedies awarded as well.
It may be that an all-or-nothing approach is too inflexible, just as the reliance principle in
Tinsley has been recognised as too inflexible, and that in some instances the court might have a discretion to split property between the settlor and beneficiary, for example.
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V. Conclusion
Patel v Mirza is a significant decision that is bound to have an impact upon the operation of the illegality defence in every area of private law. It is to be hoped that an approach which requires a range of factors to be balanced will lead to more transparent reasoning. But it is difficult to predict how the court's discretion will be exercised. 127 Of course, under Tinsley v
Milligan the "reliance principle" had proved to be sufficiently malleable to undermine commercial certainty as well, but the prospect of successfully appealing against the decision of a trial judge now appears to be very remote indeed. Unless a judge has taken into account irrelevant factors, or failed to take into account clearly relevant factors, then it should be very difficult to appeal on the basis that the judge weighed those factors incorrectly. A trial judge who has heard all the evidence is in the best position to exercise a discretion in this area.
In any event, Patel v Mirza suggests that, as a general rule, it is only in instances of serious illegality that a claim seeking to restore the parties to the status quo ante will be barred.
Yet this will not inevitably lead to satisfactory results. In particular, where a fiduciary has been bribed to act disloyally towards his or her principal, the parties should not simply be restored to their status quo ante, and the position of the principal should be protected. Indeed, courts
